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ENDING THE ENDLESS MUSIC: A SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
ANALYSIS OF BOKO HARAM VIOLENCE ON NIGERIA'S DEMOCRACY

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ABSTRACT

Every countries in the world relates with one another in one form or the other. The frequency of interaction is determined by the level of their relationship. Any country that has some levels of social, political or economic imbroglio will attract more suspicion, less friends and allies among the comity of state. Nigeria, a country strategically located in Africa has a lot of friends across the globe due to her accommodating homeland security and appealing diverse socioeconomic reserves. However, the outbreak of Boko Haram in 2009 and it continuous enormous destruction of social values and trusts within and outside the country had notable adverse implications on Nigeria's social face lifting and corporate governance among the comity of states. Nigeria is numbered among the terrorist states of the world. The objective this paper is premised on is to analyse the socio-political effect Boko Haram insurgency has on Nigeria's corporate governance and proffer the way forward. The theoretical framework of Agnew's Strain Theory is used. This paper concludes by positing the remedy of ending the endless concerto of the insurgency and ameliorating the impacts on the socio-economic and political image of the country.

Keywords: Boko Haram, Development, Governance, Nigeria, Social Image and Strain Theory.

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INTRODUCTION

Every countries in the world relates with one another in one form or the other. The relationship might be in form of political, economic, social or a combination of two or more of the relationships. The frequency of the interaction is a very important factor to understand how deep and wide the level of the relationship is. If the frequency of interaction is high, the better and stronger the level of the countries relationship will be. This implies that almost all the good-fit that manifests in one country will also have a domino effect on the other country. On the other hand, if the occurrence in the partnering country is of unpalatable melee, there will be a ripple effect evident on the other country.

It is customary that any country that has some levels of social imbroglio will attract more suspicion, less friends and allies among the comity of state. This implies that the socio-political relationship with a country under political or social duress is usually poor. If the country is undergoing some levels of internal insurrections, conflicts or civil war, the neighbouring countries are the most affected with the aftermath of the war or crises. This aftermath might be in form of mass exodus of people resulting into internally displacements and or refugee.

Nigeria is a country that is strategically located in Africa. It has a lot of friends

across the globe due to her accommodating homeland security, enticing diverse social reserves and Afrocentric—Africa centred foreign policy. No doubt Nigeria had assisted many Africa, Asian and other parts of the world in solving some of their socio political problems directly by her physical presence in terms of military capabilities or economic prowess. The tide of violence that Nigeria had quenched in other countries of the world is as well now manifesting in new dynamics in Nigeria (Aluko, Abdullahi and Balogun 2015). These include the Niger Delta militant, Biafra insurrection, Boko Haram terrorism, Fulani-Farmers feud among other ethno-religious crises (Aluko, 2014; Aluko, 2018).

This paper focuses on the impact of the Boko Haram terrorist insurgency on the socioeconomic and political status of Nigeria and proffering the way to end the endless music of violence. The outbreak of Boko Haram in 2009 till 2019 and it continuous enormous destruction of social values and trusts within and outside the country has notable adverse implications on Nigeria's social face lifting among the comity of states. Nigeria is numbered among the terrorist states of the world. The level of social security, corporate governance in the affected region and good governance in general has reduced drastically and the potential for exporting such to neighbouring countries is high. Thus, Nigerians are given extra security

scrutiny in the shores of other countries. Despite all the measures the government of Nigeria had applied on the Boko Haram menace, the terrorist group is still perpetuating several havocs and somewhat active. This unending music must stop and the socio-economic political effect of the insurgency on Nigeria must be abated. The incurring question is how can the Boko Haram insurgency effects on the socio-economic and political status of Nigeria be mitigated?

This problem is theorised within the framework of Agnew's Strain Theory. Strain theories are based on a simple idea that when people are treated defectively, they may become upset and engage in crime. Strain theories elaborate on this idea by describing the types of negative treatment most likely to result in crime, why negative treatment increases the likelihood of crime and why some people are more likely than others to respond with criminal activities from a negative treatment stimulus. This paper concludes by positing the remedy to hold back insurgency and rebuild the socio-economic and political image of the country.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION

Boko Haram

The nomenclature 'Boko Haram' is derived from a combination of Hausa word 'boko' (book) and the Arabic word 'haram' (unlawful). Combined, Boko

Haram means 'Western education is unlawful.' Boko Haram has even rejected the designation 'Western education is unlawful', and instead, prefers the slogan, 'Western culture is forbidden' (Onuoha, 2012: 136). In northern Nigeria a distinction is often drawn between makarantan books - schools providing 'Western' education and makarantan addini - school for religious instruction or makarantan allo - school of the slate understood to be Koranic schools (Agbibo N.D). Isa, (2010: 322) argues that Boko Haram implies a 'sense of rejection' and 'resistance to imposition of Western education and its system of colonial social organisation, which replaced and degraded the earlier Islamic order of the jihadist state (the Sokoto Caliphate)'.

Isa (2010: 332) remarked that,

[The] Islamic scholars and clerics who once held sway in the Caliphate State and courts assigned the name 'boko' to northern elites who spoke, acted, ruled and operated the state like their Western colonial masters. It is not uncommon to hear in discussions among Islamist scholars and average northerners that poverty and collapse governance – the bane of the region – can be blamed on the failures and corrupt attitudes of 'yan boko' (modern elites trained at secular schools)

who have acquired a Western education and are currently in positions of power. As such, the system represented by the 'yan boko' is unjust, secular and has no divine origin. It is therefore un-Islamic, which in turn accounts for its ineptitude and corruptness.

The Boko Haram group, which initially called itself the 'Nigerian Taliban', adopted a 'live-off-the-land' lifestyle and set up a camp in a remote area of northeast Nigeria, which the group dubbed 'Afghanistan' (Agbibo 2014). Boko Haram like Maitatsine of the 1980s, strove for self-exclusion of its members from the general corrupt society by living in areas remote or far away from society in order to intellectualize and radicalize the revolutionary jihad processes that would ultimately lead to violent takeover of the Nigerian (Umar 2011).

The politicising of Yusuf (a foremost leader of the group) in 2002 is another dimension of the radical and violent revulsion of Boko Haram. There is evidence that around 2002, Yusuf was invited by a foremost gubernatorial candidate in Borno state so as to earn the support of his large youth movement, in exchange for full implementation of Sharia and promises of senior state government positions for his followers in the event of an electoral victory. As the group rose to prominence, the state

religious commissioner was accused of providing resources to Yusuf, while the government never implemented full Sharia (Africa Report, 3 April 2014). Having used Yusuf's support as a vote-catching device, these politicians then discarded him. Feeling used, an embittered Yusuf went on to form Boko Haram in 2002.

Another popular aetiological reason proffer for the emergence of Boko Haram in the literature is the extent of relative poverty deprivation, long period of alienation and inequality in the northern Nigeria. This made some analyst to opine that underdevelopment is the immediate cause for the extremist groups to evolve in the country. However, Clapham (2004: 200) argues more broadly that 'the disregard for law and order in African states was basically the result of the legacy of bad governance. Mustapha (2012), for instance opined that Boko Haram is the symptom of the failure of nation-building and democratic politics break-down in Nigeria. The heart cries of northern youths were largely on heard by the government or jettison by the leaders in the region. The resource allocated from the revenue sharing formula of the country to develop both human and capital projects were perceived to be diverted for personal aggrandisement.

Kwaja (2011), simply put it that religious anthropologic dimensions of the conflict have been misconstrued as the primary driver of violence, when in fact,

disenfranchisement and inequality are the root causes. Kukah (2012), in his comment observed a nuanced movement away from the poverty caused conflict connections to the bad governance-conflict nexus. Kukah argues that religion is used to mobilize against modern civilization which the northern Nigerian Islamist extremist sees as the root cause of social anomalies.

The general objective and ideology of this insurgent group is based on religion and anti-Western orientations and civilization. The immediate objective of Boko Haram is to establish strict *sharia* rule in northern Nigeria, where a large population is Muslim. Although the twelve (12) northern states have implemented *sharia* governance, Boko Haram believes they are too elementary. An Islamist ideology opined that Muslims are required to wage *jihād* until all territory once under Muslim rule is returned. Boko Haram regards itself as the successor to Usman Dan Fodio who founded the Sokoto Caliphate, which ruled parts of Nigeria, Niger and Cameroon from 1804 until it was formally abolished by the British in 1904. Therefore the current Sultan of Sokoto, who has a traditional religious and tribal role, is perceived by Boko Haram as un-Islamic because of his ties with the Nigerian government.

However, like all Islamists, Boko Haram's ultimate objective is to bring all

of mankind under *sharia* governance. Yusuf preached (<http://almanac.afpc.org/boko-haram>) that a *sharia* state “*should be established in Nigeria, and if possible all over the world, through preaching the faith (dawa)*.” Furthermore, Boko Haram pledges its allegiance to Al-Qaeda another terrorist group in the Middle East. According to the Al-Qaeda Leader Osama Bin Laden “*In fact, Muslims are obligated to raid the land of the infidels, occupy them, and exchange their systems of governance for an Islamic system, barring any practice that contradicts the sharia from being publicly voiced among the people, as was the case at the dawn of Islam.*” In another separate speech he reiterated that

“There are only three choices in Islam: either willing submission [conversion]; or payment of the jizya, though physical though not spiritual, submission to the authority of Islam; or the sword—for it is not right to let him live. The matter is summed up for every person alive: either submit, or live under the suzerainty of Islam, or die.” (www.terrorism.com/alqaeda)

Boko Haram has specifically identified the U.S. and other Western countries as eventual targets. In their declaration, Shekau (2012) said “O America, die with your fury” and he pledged the group to fight “the Jews and the Crusader Christians.” and he pledged

his fighters “support for *jihad* in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kashmir, Chechnya, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Somalia, Algeria, Libya, and Mali.” Shekau (2014) declaration in a videotaped address on the socio political existence of Nigeria becomes more definite when an emphatic declaration was made against the Christian and democracy as a whole:

“We know what is happening in this world, it is a jihad war against Christians and Christianity. It is a war against Western education, democracy and constitution... This is what I know in Quran. This is a war against Christians and democracy and their constitution, Allah says we should finish them when we get them.”

These statements are reflections of several strains and distresses that a group of people in Nigeria had been facing over time. The accumulation of stress and duress, neglect and poverty usually leads to a state of oversaturation and an eventual the yield point. At this point, one of the prominent options left for the aggrieved groups is to wage war against the perceive aggressors—in this case, it is a case of Boko Haram insurgency against the Nigerian Government.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Agnew’s Strain Theory

Strain theory was developed from the work of Durkheim and Merton and taken from the theory of anomie. Durkheim focused on the decrease of societal restraint and the strain that resulted at the individual level, and Merton studied the cultural imbalance that exists between goal and the norms of the individuals of society. Anomie can be broken down into two levels. The first of these levels is the macro side of anomie, which is manifest in the inability of society to set limits on goals and regulate individual conduct. The micro side of anomie, also known as strain theory, is focused on the reasons behind the increased likelihood of deviance that results from the breakdown of basic societal norms, values and corporate governance.

Robert Agnew’s revisions of the strain theory address many of the criticisms of the original strain theory. According to the original strain theory, an increase in aspirations and a decrease in expectations should lead to an increase in delinquency; however, this was not found to be the case (Agnew, 1985). Agnew’s general strain theory is based on the general idea that “when people are treated badly they may get upset and engage in crime”. Agnew noted two different ways of identifying and measuring strain in an individual’s life. The first way is the subjective approach, where the researcher directly asks the individual whether they dislike the way which they are being treated. The second approach is the objective view, in which case the

researcher asks individuals about pre-determined causes of strain. The causes of strain are things that the researcher identifies as treatment that a member of the group being studied would dislike.

Strain results from an individual's failure to achieve positively valued goals, the loss of positively valued stimuli and the presentation of negative stimuli. Agnew noted that there are three different types of goals for which members of the society strive. The first of these is money. Agnew (1994) found that monetary strain was related to crime in a limited fashion, and that the previous studies may not have accurately measured all aspects of monetary goal blockage. Another type of positively valued goal is that of status and respect. This type of status differs culturally, but in order for an individual to prove their masculinity, they may resort to crime to achieve that status. The third type of goal is autonomy, the power over oneself that is valued in a society. Strain induced by autonomy mainly affects secluded group of people and the lower class because of their position in society.

Agnew proposed that the need for autonomy can result in delinquency and crime, as the individual tried to assert autonomy, achieve autonomy, and relieve frustration against those who have denied the individual autonomy. These previously mentioned goals turn into strain when the individual is faced with

certain disjunctions in their life. The first of these disjunctions is the disjunction between aspirations and expectations. For instance the idea of the American Dream then causes strain and frustration in the individual who cannot achieve this dream through legitimate means or the desire to establish Islamic states by terrorist and extremist groups. This theory has been criticized because it does not explain middle class crime.

Another source of strain is due to goal blockage. This disjunction rests on the outcome of an individual's behaviour. Strain is increased when the actual achievements of an individual are less than that which the individual had expected or they are completely blocked (Agnew 1992). The third type of disjunction occurs when the actual outcome that an individual faces is not the just or fair outcome that he felt was deserved. Individuals do not need to have a specific outcome in mind, but based on their input, they have an idea of what would be a fair outcome.

Strain from the outside environment can cause many negative feelings in an individual including defeat, despair, and fear, but the feeling that is most applicable to crime is anger (Agnew, 1992:59). Agnew asserted that individuals become angry when they blame their negative circumstance relationships on others and found to incite a person to action, lower inhibitions, and

create a desire for revenge (Agnew, 1992; Agnew, 1995). Anger and frustration may also enable the individual to justify crime which is most evident in terrorism and religious extremists.

METHODOLOGY

The qualitative research technique of process tracing is adopted in this work. The process tracing research is a causality research which tends to see the process of occurrence and the reasons behind the trend of actions in the process. Process tracing involve the identifying political and social phenomena and systematically describing them. Collier (2011) noted that it also entails evaluating prior explanatory hypotheses, discovering new hypotheses, and assessing these new causal claims, gaining insight into causal mechanisms. It as well provide an alternative means compared with conventional regression analysis and inference based on statistical models of addressing challenging problems such as reciprocal causation, spuriousness, and selection bias.


Process tracing often focus only on a single case and is a useful tool for testing theories. It is expedient to use a number of histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other similar sources pertaining to their specific case in order to determine whether a proposed theoretical hypothesis is evident in the sequence of a case. The case of Boko

Haram socio-economic and political menace in Nigeria is not an exemption. This method is used to obtain the onset, metamorphosis and the effects of the group on Nigeria and the entire world as a unit.

BOKO HARAM'S DESECRATES IN NIGERIA

The Boko Haram had caused a lot of socio-political damages and imbroglio in Nigeria. Nathaniel (2016) opined that the damages done to the socioeconomic and corporate governance in Nigeria will cost a fortune to remedy. A concerted effort will be required with stronger political will. The figure I shows the numbers of death that has been recorded so far. The figure depicts data from the year 2010 till June 30 2016 when the embattlements were fierce. It revealed that there had been several casualties in Nigeria both among the civilian population and the military task force. The data revealed that there is a gradual rise in the civilian casualties since 2010 while the military casualties remain relatively stable. However, there was an exponential increase in the civilian casualties since 2012 up to 2015 while the military casualties remain at its geometric increase.

The initial civilian casualties were below 1000 death per year in 2010 and 2011 respectively while the military casualties were below 1000 death per year in 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 respectively. The civilian casualties stood above 1000 deaths in 2012 and over 6000 deaths from 2013 to 2015 per year (Johns Hopkins University 2016). The military casualties stood above 1000 deaths in 2014 and below 4000 deaths in 2015. However, in 2016, both the civilian casualties and the military casualties fall drastic to below 2000 and 1000 respectively.



Title: Militant and Civilian Casualties in the Boko Haram Insurgency, 2010-2016
(Source: Johns Hopkins University Nigeria Social Violence Database; Data from 2016 is through June 30).

The figure 2 below also shows the spread of attacks of the Boko Haram in the

country. The major location is Maiduguri-Nigeria and in other places such as other states in the Northern Nigeria is outlined. The data frequency onset of both Maiduguri and other locations is 2010 and ends in 2016. The data shows that there are more socio-political imbroglio and acrimony in other parts of the region than the epicentre of the Boko Harams. The numbers of attacks by this terrorist group is about 50 attacks and below since 2010 with its lowest at 2010 and 2014 while the highest frequency of attacks was in 2012 and 2015 respectively. The frequency of attack in other places other than the terrorist epicentre was only below 50 attacks in 2010 and early periods of 2011 respectively.

The frequency of attack climbed up consistently at the late period of 2011 to above 140 various attacks in 2012 and much more to about 200 attacks in 2014 and a ceiling of about 250 attacks in 2015. This trend however drastically reduced sequentially to about 50 attacks in 2016. However, the socio-political effect on the country is enormous. Aremu, Aluko and Isiaq (2016) and Osezua and Aluko (2016) posited that the overall effect of terrorist attack on the socio-political system is untold hardship, rise in poverty level, increase criminal syndicates, high rate of internally displaced people (IDPs) and inhumane behaviours such as increase in sexual harassments, prostitution, child labour and frequent outbreak of diseases due to

IDPs poor camping.




Figure 2: Boko Haram Attacks in Maiduguri and Other Locations, 2010-2016 (Source: Johns Hopkins University Nigeria Social Violence Database; Data from 2016 is through June 30).

The table I and figure III as well shows a gender-social dimension to the terrorist attack in Nigeria. It is observed that from the period observed, the use of female as object of death prosecution or death trap appreciated towards the end of the year and up to the beginning of the New Year. The use of female as a suicide bomber is a deceptive tactics and a sure way to disguise before the security agents and other community members so as to penetrate the target areas. This has cast a suspicious eye on the female folk in the region and other related places as a potential death trap agent and threat to the community at large.

Year-Month of Occurrence	No of Female Suicide Bombing

June 2014	1
July 2014	4
August 2014	0
September 2014	0
October 2014	0
November 2014	3
December 2014	3
January 2015	3
February 2015	4
March 2015	1

Table I showing female Suicide bombers in Nigeria 2014-2015 Source: Researcher's Online Survey (2018)




Figure III showing female Suicide bombers in Nigeria 2014-2015 Source: Researcher's Online research (2018)

Some of the heinous activities of the Boko Haram are captured in the table II below to corroborate their negative impacts on the community's socioeconomic and political acumen. The list is not exhaustive, the selections are

JOURNAL OF POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (JPIR)

based on the root cause of the terrorist acts and some peculiar terrorist acts with higher number of casualties.

Date	Issue	Casualty			
			28-29, 2014	Adamawa State, killing scores and displacing thousands of people.	(60) people
June 12, 2009	Mohammed Yusuf, the Boko Haram leader threatened reprisals in a video recording after the killing of seventeen sect members in a joint military and police operation in Borno State. This occurred after a disagreement by the members of the sect concerning using crash helmets during the burial procession for one of them who died in a car accident.	Seventeen (17) sect members	November 3, 2014	Suicide bomber killed 15 people in Yobe.	Fifteen (15) people died
			November 6-7, 2014	Overran Gashala village, Hong Local Government, Adamawa State, killing more than four persons in the process. The group bombed a new generation bank near Azare, Bauchi State, killing not less than 14 people.	Fourteen people (14) died.
July 26, 2009	Police allegedly killed the leader of the sect, Mohammed Yusuf, under the police watch after soldiers, who arrested him, handed him over to the police alive. The ensuing uprising led to a military crackdown that left more than 800 people dead. A mosque in Maiduguri, Borno State which served as the headquarters of the sect	Over eight hundred (800) people died	November 16, 2014	Female suicide bomber attacked Azare market, Bauchi, leaving not less than 13 people dead, with over 60 persons injured	Thirteen (13) people died, with over 60 persons injured
			January	Boko Haram attacked the	Abolished

JOURNAL OF POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (JPIR)

ary 3, 2015	towns of Baga and Doron Baga, Borno, Nigeria from January 3-7. Reports indicate that Boko Haram shot indiscriminately from armoured vehicles and set over 620 buildings in Baga and 3,100 in Doron Baga on fire. On January 12, the Nigerian government reported that only 150 people had died in the attacks, but satellite images released by Amnesty International on January 15 suggest the number of dead much higher (2,000 killed, unknown wounded) http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/553?highlight=boko+haram#note63	ut 2,000 killed	
	Febr uary 2015	Chadian troops invaded a Boko Haram stronghold in Gamboru killing 200 militants. In response, Boko Haram murdered 70 civilians in a neighboring Cameroonian town, Fotokol http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/553?highlight=boko+haram#note67	d Two hundred 200 milit ants and 70 civil ians died
	Mar ch 28, 2015	Boko Haram killed 41 people in an attempt to keep civilians from the polls on the Nigerian Election Day. However, millions of citizens still voted in the closely contested election	Forty one (41) people died
Febr uary 2015	Aug ust 18, 2015	150 civilians drowned in a river or were shot dead fleeing from Boko Haram gunmen in a village in the north-eastern Nigerian province, Yobe	One Hundred and fifty (150) civil ian died
	Aug ust 21,	Militants on horseback shot at civilians in remote villages in north eastern,	Seventy nine

JOURNAL OF POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (JPIR)

2015	Nigeria http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/553?highlight=boko+haram#note74	(79) civil ian died			nded
			Dece mber 2015	Explosives detonated at a mosque in Maiduguri, Borno, Nigeria	Two nty (20) civil ians kille d, sixty five (65) wou nded
Aug ust 25, 2015	Two teenage suicide bombers, one male and one female, detonated explosives in Damaturu, Nigeria	Five (5) kille d, 41 wou nded			
Octo ber 2015	Boko Haram fighters bombed Abuja, Nigeria and suicide bombed a mainly Nigerian refugee camp in Chad	Fifty four (54) civil ian died fifty one (51) wou nded	Febr uary 1, 2016	Militants attacked Dalori, Nigeria with suicide bombs and allegedly burned children alive	Eigh ty six (86) civil ian died
			Febr uary 9, 2016	Two female suicide bombers detonated explosives at a displaced persons camp in Dika, Nigeria	Fifty eight (58) civil ians died
Nov emb er 27, 2015	A Boko Haram suicide bomber detonated explosives in Dakasoye, Kano, Nigeria, targeting a Shiite religious procession	Two nty two (22) civil ian died, Thirt y eight (38) wou	Aug ust 21, 2016	Militants attacked Kuburwa village, killing civilians and raping women	Elev en (11) civil ians died

Source: Researcher's Compilation (2016)
and Stanford University (2016)

**IMPLICATIONS ON NIGERIA'S
ECONOMY, DEMOCRACY AND
SOCIAL IMAGE**

The menace of terrorist attack on any country is of terrible and dreadful consequences. The dimensions of such implications transcend the corporate governance or social image desecration but cut across the political, geographical and economic implications. However, this section focuses on the socio-economic and political—(corporate governance) analysis of the Boko Haram terrorism on Nigeria's democracy and her social image. This will be considered from the lights of national self-esteem, Nigeria/Africa- weak state domino effects, Nigeria's leadership incapacity and other social and corporate governance menaces.

Considering Nigeria's ego as a single largest black country in the world, Africa's leading economy and widest socio political market in Africa, the locale and the self-esteem of Nigerians is seriously under threat. The terrorist acts have damage the psychology of foreigners to Nigeria's environment and the potential market size is seen as a potential threat to their lives and business pursuit. The locals self-esteem about their community's peace and security has diminished because of the stigma of being reckoned to as a terrorist ridden country coupled with the great loss of lives, damage to properties, untold hardship derived repercussion of

psychology depressions incurred by the locale victims.

The perception of Nigeria and eventually Africa as a weak state entity is another implication of the terrorist group's orchestrations in Nigeria. Several violent and undemocratic movements has ravaged Africa and the cumulating effect of the Boko Haram terrorist group in Nigeria have to a large extent struck Africans democracy out of proper shape. This to some extent classified Nigeria as a state with weak corporate governance which cannot secure her territorial integrity against internal insurrection and external aggressions. This socio-political menace also affects the face-lifting of the entirety of Africa as internally fissured states.

Although there is no nation of the world that do not have a group agitating for their rights and privileges in any form be it violent or nonviolent, Nigeria's case is not in isolation. However, the terrorism acts had impacted a measure of dilemma on Nigeria's socio-political platform. This is in such a way that other West African nations are beginning to doubt Nigeria's leadership capability in the region despite the fact that Nigeria has participated in a number of state peace keeping and building operations in many African states and indeed other regions of the world. The extent of death incurred and destruction of lives and property with little success over the terrorist group had

dent in a way the socio-political leadership role of Nigeria in Africa.

Another prominent socio-political factor affecting Nigeria due to the Boko Haram menace is Food insecurity, malnutrition, drug and substance abuse, illegal gun circulation, Small and Light Weapons and general security obscurity. Due to the insecure farmlands, farmers of the affected regions could not have any substantial farm produce since the onset of the terrorism (for about ten years 2009-2019). This had lead to drastic shortage of food supply in the region especially for the vulnerable groups-women and children. This led to malnutrition and preventable death incurred from inadequate attention to tender lives. Also as a means of survival, the rate of drug and substance abuse is on the increase coupled with the circulation of illegal weapons in terms of small and light weapons. All of these socio-economic and political challenges are traceable to the Boko Haram fissures and endless music on the democracy and governance in Nigeria.

ENDING THE UNENDING MUSIC OF VIOLENCE

Ending the unending music of violence of the Boko Haram terrorist sects is paramount not only to Nigerian's government and Africa but also to the entire world. This is because the menace has a global reckoning. The first solution is ensuring that the government in

Nigeria incorporates good governance in its corporate affairs. The citizens should be seen as the king and the political leaders in the legislatives, executive and the judicial personnel in the political or elective offices should serve the interest of public for the public good. This is because selfless services promote corporate governance and development.

The era of impunity, corruption, embezzlement of public funds, utilising public offices for personal aggrandizement and the support of ethnic chauvinism, religious bigotry and social seclusion must be summarily and officially stopped (Aluko, 2019). These mishaps have negative impacts on the citizens and makes some to 'cut-corners' so as to make ends meet. Once this acts are stopped, the interest of the citizens to be promoted and the national largess will be evenly distributed across board in accordance with the national revenue sharing formula. Employment will be generated and youth's hooliganism due to unemployment will subside.

The upholding of education which is the bed rock of development in any society should be effectively integrated into the nook, cranny and the fabrics of all communities in Nigeria. Regardless of the ethnic peculiarities, the local, state and federal government should promote free or almost free education in areas that are worst hit by illiteracy or education less developed regions. This is peculiar to areas in the extreme North and Eastern

parts of the country. Adult education should be resuscitated and encouraged so that the younger ones will also value the importance of education instead of 'free money streak' mentality.

The industrialisation prospect of the nation should be revived. Public private investment partnership on strategic areas in the economy should be encouraged instead of the over-reliance on 'oil money'. Each community's areas of economic advantage and raw materials such as agriculture, mining, art and craft among others should be focus on and industrialised instead of using crude knowledge or technologies. This will eventually create more jobs for the youths and many will be taken out of the street into a meaningful economic life. This implies that they will no longer be vulnerable to joining terrorist groups due to inadequate civic knowledge and relatively stable income.

However, the fortification of the military and other security allied must be ensured by the government. This will serve as military threat to any individual or groups that want to take the country at ransom. The military training and the supply of equipment must be up-to-date and above the type any insurgent groups may have in possession. Adequate security intelligence must be gathered and promptly utilised so as to overcome the imminent danger on the country. These measures will easily and adequately end the endless music of violence in Nigeria.

CONCLUSION

The menace of Boko Haram on the world is a unpleasant. The terrorist group had killed up to one fifth of the death incurred during the America Civil war of 1861 to 1865. The outbreak of Boko Haram in 2009 till date, with it continuous enormous destruction of social values and trusts within and outside the country has notable adverse implications on Nigeria's social-economic and political face lifting among the comity of states. Nigeria is now reckoned as among the terrorist states of the world. The level of corporate governance and security in Nigeria has reduced drastically and the potential for exporting such is seen as high, thus Nigerians are given extra security scrutiny in the shores of other countries. Despite all the measures the government of Nigeria had applied on the Boko Haram menace, the terrorist group is somewhat active.

Borrowing a clue from the research focus of this paper which is to assess the impact of the Boko Haram terrorist insurgency on the socioeconomic and political status of Nigeria and proffering the way to end the endless music of violence. Tracing the process, effect and catastrophe caused by the Boko Haram in Nigeria and indeed the world, one will say it is a major catastrophe. The socio-economic and political effects on Nigeria as well is of a huge magnitude which ranges from reduced self-esteem of the huge economic capability of Nigeria, Nigeria's weak

state status and a fringe on Nigeria's leadership capacity in Africa. Other social menaces traced as a spill over effect include food insecurity, malnutrition, drug and substance abuse, illegal gun circulation Small and Light Weapons and general security obscurity.

It is pertinent to conclude by positing the remedy to hold back insurgency and the huge impact on the social, economic and political image of the country. A virile spot is to use socio economy policy to enhance the standard of living of Nigerian away from what can be enticed with economic largess by sphincter terrorist groups. The provision of employment to the teeming youth population through industrialization of the production sectors will reduce the agitation and demand or supply of violence. Also the deemphasizing of religious bigotry and ethnic chauvinism across the country through the use of unifying federal character principle in the allocation of federal largess and merit system without favouritism, nepotism, prebendalism, patrimonialism and or neo-patrimonialism. These lee ways can be implemented by the government at all level and their respective civil organization tributaries.

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